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Abstract— As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s 
Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, 
and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands 
dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation 
(IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety 
and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded 
software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of 
the Moon by 2024.  Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire 
to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its 
stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance 
positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their 
combined role in support of a safe and successful flight.  In order 
to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition 
to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in 
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in 
support of software assurance.  IV&V recognizes significant 
benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by 
assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for 
documenting and managing assurance claims.  In order to reap 
these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case 
concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based 
assurance.  Because of this, assurance cases created and used by 
IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a 
development project or embedded software assurance 
organization.  IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon 
standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by 
IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and 
implementation.  IV&V constructs an independent network of 
claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments.  
Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated 
software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and 
executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide 
evidence to either support or refute the claim.  This emerging 
risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into 
practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, 
the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System 
with astronauts on board. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
NASA is looking to return astronauts to the Moon by the end 
of 2024.  The Artemis lunar exploration program will enable 
NASA to achieve this goal.  The Artemis program is made up 
of various programs within NASA as well as collaborations 
with NASA’s commercial and international partners.  The 
Artemis program’s next major milestone will occur in the fall 
of 2020.  Artemis I will be the unmanned launch of the Orion 
spacecraft on the newly developed Space Launch System 
(SLS) from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center where the 
Exploration Ground System (EGS) is located.  This mission 
will send Orion to the Moon in order to test these three 
programs’ abilities to support the next flight, Artemis II, 
which will occur in the fall of 2022, and will be the first time 
astronauts will fly on board Orion.  That mission will fly 
humans around the Moon in preparation for the next flight, 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001646 2020-03-28T19:12:32+00:00Z
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Artemis III, which will utilize the Gateway and Human 
Landing System (HLS) to land astronauts on the surface of 
the Moon in 2024.  [1]   
The focus of NASA’s Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) Program is on assuring the safety- and 
mission-critical software that is essential to fly these missions 
and return our astronauts home safely.  The Artemis missions 
utilize human-rated safety-critical software across many 
different platforms.  Software is critical to prepare the SLS 
Launch Vehicle (LV) for launch on the ground within EGS 
and is crucial onboard the LV itself, controlling where the LV 
is flying.  It helps Orion execute many capabilities during its 
journey to the Moon and back, executing critical mission 
events all the way until just after it splashes down.  Software 
will be crucial in autonomous operation of Gateway, the 
habitable space for the astronauts to utilize while they are 
orbiting the Moon, and the HLS will rely upon software to 
travel to the surface of the Moon, and safely return to the 
Gateway.  It is the backbone of the Mission Control Center 
(MCC) applications that will monitor and assist the crew 
while they are on their mission.  IV&V has spent several 
years gaining system understanding in this extremely 
complex software across many of these platforms.  In that 
time, the IV&V teams supporting the Artemis program have 
understood the risk associated with all the critical mission 
capabilities that will ultimately make these missions 
successful.   
Due to the establishment of the Artemis program, IV&V will 
now be required on Gateway, HLS, and MCC in addition to 
EGS, SLS, and Orion.  With the focus shifting to landing 
astronauts on the surface of the Moon in 2024, and the 
ramping up of development on Gateway and HLS, NASA 
IV&V felt the need to make a change.  Prior to this change, 
the work on the EGS, SLS, and Orion IV&V teams was done 
in relative isolation.  The teams would work with each other 
when appropriate, but IV&V added assurance at the project 
level, not the mission level.  As NASA shifted toward a 
program vision to land astronauts on the surface of the Moon, 
IV&V needed to devise a way to operate as an assurance 
provider for the Artemis mission as a whole.   
This change resulted in the creation of the Artemis IV&V 
Program.  The Artemis IV&V Program is a team of 
approximately 70 people who are responsible for adding 
assurance for the software that executes the highest risk 
mission capabilities within EGS, SLS, Orion, Gateway, HLS, 
and MCC.  The Artemis IV&V Program interfaces with each 
of the programs mentioned and remains in sync with 
development, focusing on how all of these capabilities from 
across several platforms ultimately come together and make 
the mission a success. 
NASA IV&V will play a critical role in the agency’s goal of 
landing astronauts on the Moon.  In order to achieve the 
aggressive schedule of putting the first woman, and the next 
man, on the Moon by the end of 2024, the agency will have 
to accept some risk.   The Artemis IV&V Team will help 
identify that risk throughout the development of the mission, 
as well as add assurance that the safety- and mission-critical 
software will do what it is supposed to do, not do what it is 
not supposed to do, and respond appropriately under adverse 
conditions.  The next part of this paper focuses on how IV&V 
has built an assurance case and accompanying process in 
order to solve the problems the Artemis IV&V Team was 
encountering relative to the ultimate goal of adding assurance 
for the Artemis program. 
 
2. CHALLENGES OF ASSURING A MISSION 
INVOLVING A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
The Artemis program contains several complex systems that 
need to work together safely to execute mission scenarios.  
Before the creation of the Artemis IV&V program, IV&V 
projects operated separately on the separate elements of EGS, 
SLS, and Orion.  In addition to these three IV&V project 
teams was a Human Explorations and Operations (HEO) 
IV&V Integration Team, which sought to understand and 
assure the end-to-end perspective of the avionics and 
software interfaces between these systems. 
Our means of generating software assurance are based upon 
the IV&V Capability Based Assurance (CBA) approach.  In 
CBA, the mission, system, and software capabilities and their 
identified risks serve as the basis for planning what analysis 
activities are necessary to satisfy an assurance objective, 
while the IV&V Technical Framework [2] objectives, IV&V 
Catalog of Methods, and the available software artifacts are 
used as inputs to determine how this analysis should be 
conducted.  IV&V uses the results of the analyses to draw 
conclusions of the software’s ability to meet particular 
mission objectives, and come to an understanding of risk and 
the system itself to further sharpen the assurance design using 
a follow-the-risk approach.   
Follow-the-Risk (FTR) is the approach by which IV&V 
understands, identifies, and prioritizes areas of risk within the 
projects’ capabilities and software, in order to focus effort in 
the areas of highest risk.  The goal of this approach is to 
reduce the residual risk across the entire risk landscape.  
Rather than reducing risk to "zero" in any given area, a 
follow-the-risk execution strategy moves the analysis effort 
to other higher risk areas when risk in a particular area is 
lowered sufficiently.  IV&V assesses risk continuously, 
allowing focus to change as needed.  Our decomposition of 
the Artemis mission capabilities uses the FTR approach to 
drive the identification of analysis needed to provide software 
assurance and drive down the risk. 
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In order to add assurance for a successful mission, IV&V 
examines system-to-system software behaviors with respect 
to mission capabilities.  Specifically, the HEO Integration 
IV&V Team seeks to add assurance for the Functional and 
Operational Capabilities (FOCs) required to perform the 
mission.  The HEO Integration IV&V Team focuses on these 
FOCs, which are a summary of applicable capabilities 
derived from the Concept of Operations and are allocated to 
each of the development programs supporting the Artemis 
program. 
However, the other Artemis IV&V Teams worked separately, 
reported to different stakeholders, and communicated 
software assurance differently as compared to the HEO 
Integration IV&V Team.  They focused on the individual 
system and software capabilities for their own role within the 
mission, and thus the objectives and goals for assurance were 
varied.  In other words, the HEO Integration IV&V Team 
desired to collect and communicate assurance on cross-
program and mission functionality, but the EGS, SLS, and 
Orion IV&V Teams performed analysis on software entities 
and system behaviors. 
It was therefore very difficult at times for the four IV&V 
projects to align their assurances to the FOCs, and difficult to 
do a clean cross-program roll-up of mission scenario-level 
assurances.  This caused challenges not just in reporting 
results, but also in communication across the projects, 
prioritization of analysis tasks, and allocation of resources to 
the riskiest parts of the software. 
IV&V encountered gaps in assurance claims because the 
system-to-system integration arguments were not clearly 
integrated into the assurance hierarchy, and, more generally, 
because there was not a consistent methodology for 
organizing and decomposing assurance goals, establishing 
and documenting assurance strategies, and selecting and 
applying analysis methods.   
At the time, the Artemis Teams used the bug tracking and 
task management tool Jira, developed by Atlassian, to hold 
the repository of assurance data, as well as to direct and 
manage the analysis tasks.  In order to compile and report on 
combined IV&V software assurances, which included 
representing levels of confidence across the four projects, 
assurance conclusions had to be collected from each IV&V 
project and organized into groups relating to the FOCs.  A 
hierarchy of "Assurance Goal" Jira tickets was used to "roll-
up" assurance data to the parent assurance claims at the 
mission level.   
This proved difficult to perform, because of both the 
inconsistency of assurance data capture across projects, as 
discussed above, as well as the fact that Jira is not an optimal 
tool for managing and comprehending a network of 
information.  Furthermore, assurance arguments regarding 
the function from a system-of-systems perspective were 
difficult to identify and articulate within the sea of hundreds 
of Jira assurance tickets. 
In spite of difficulties encountered in the assurance goal "roll-
up" effort, the IV&V Projects were extremely effective in 
identifying software defects and driving positive change into 
the software. However, IV&V faced some challenges in 
cohesively communicating assurance at the Artemis level of 
abstraction.  These challenges impressed the need to establish 
a unified assurance approach for all elements of the Artemis 
program, with the ability to extend the approach as new 
elements or projects are added, such as the Gateway and HLS 
elements in the near future. 
Complex and subtle interactions between system elements 
may be overlooked in an assurance architecture. This is also 
true of operational dependencies and prerequisite conditions 
between transacting systems. It requires a broad scope of 
expertise in order to understand the convolutions and 
ramifications. Assurance goals are needed that represent 
mission operational capabilities and their corresponding 
behaviors, which emerge from the interactions between the 
individual systems. In addition to designing these goals, we 
want to gain confidence that hazardous and mission-ending 
emergent behaviors will not occur. A detailed understanding 
of each of the avionics and software subsystems that support 
the interchanges between the various Artemis program 
elements is required. Furthermore, knowledge about mission 
operations is needed to fill in the gaps between the mission 
level operational requirements and software subsystem 
requirements that support them. It usually takes members 
from a wide range of pertinent disciplines to help bring to 
light aspects of the integrated behaviors that are not visible 
when considering the separate system elements on their own. 
IV&V had to develop an approach to assurance that better 
enables this perspective and synergizes the inputs from each 
Artemis IV&V Team. 
 
3. THE ARTEMIS IV&V LEAN EVENT 
Artemis IV&V Leadership decided a multi-day Lean Six 
Sigma Event (“Lean Event”) would be an appropriate activity 
to begin to address these challenges of assuring the software 
for the Artemis “system of systems.”  The benefits of a Lean 
methodology could be leveraged to increase speed and 
efficiency, and Six Sigma to increase consistency and quality.  
As noted by NASA’s Lean Six Sigma Program, applying 
these principles and methodologies can have the effect of 
consistently delivering high quality products and services by 
removing non-value added activities from existing processes, 
thereby reducing costs and increasing quality. [3] 
The Lean Event was scheduled for three days in early June of 
2019.  The team consisted of twelve IV&V analysts, 
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representing all four Artemis IV&V Teams:  EGS, SLS, 
Orion, and HEO Integration.  Several of the team members 
selected traveled from their locations at other NASA centers 
or developer sites to include a variety of perspectives.  Two 
IV&V Project Managers and a member of IV&V’s Technical 
Quality and Excellence (TQ&E) Team, all of whom had 
experience or certification in Lean Six Sigma processes, 
facilitated the event. 
The main objective of the Lean Event, best characterized as 
a Process Development Kaizen, was to determine an Artemis-
wide IV&V workflow to support scoping, performing, 
capturing, and reporting assurance analysis - independent of 
mission - for Artemis II and beyond.  This workflow would 
be required to support an agreed upon mission phase 
decomposition, support hierarchical decomposition of all 
assurance goals, be able to evaluate risk across the mission 
and systems, identify Artemis IV&V organizational 
structure, and establish how products would be logged, 
tracked, and reported in real time.  A secondary objective was 
to plan a way to move away from using Jira as an assurance 
data repository and propose how the assurance data should be 
managed moving forward. 
The driving Problem Statement read, “Our Artemis IV&V 
projects operate as four independent projects.  The projects’ 
outputs are varied in some form and make it difficult to 
communicate across projects, roll-up assurance to the 
mission level, and prioritize work and resources across 
projects.  This approach results in numerous process 
inefficiencies and variation in the deliverables within 
Artemis IV&V.”  It was Artemis IV&V Leadership’s view 
that by identifying and removing process inefficiencies and 
reducing variation of the outputs, a streamlined single process 
combined with standardized outputs could be utilized within 
Artemis IV&V resulting in a consistent message that can be 
delivered to various stakeholders at all levels. 
The ground rules and assumptions imposed on the Lean 
Event included that team members, as well as leadership, 
would be open to new and possibly radical ideas, and the 
team would deliver an Implementation Plan with a 
corresponding Transition Plan at the conclusion of the Event.  
An additional constraint would be that the Artemis I software 
assurance evidence already in existence and/or currently 
being worked would be leveraged where appropriate, or 
discarded where it would present a hindrance.   
The first day of the Lean Event kicked off with team 
introductions and IV&V project definition.  Each Project’s 
(SLS, EGS, Orion, and HEO Integration) process was 
defined and presented through a process map.  This gave team 
members from the various projects insight into the various 
analysis procedures, product evidence types and cadence, and 
the IV&V and developer methodologies (CBA, Agile) in use.  
This activity allowed for a baseline review for each project, 
establishing boundaries and level of detail, process steps, 
sequence, and flow.  Team members could also voice 
questions and comments on the other projects’ processes to 
verify completeness. 
The team continued this measurement and analysis activity 
by brainstorming potential problems and challenges to the 
current processes.  Each project group had the opportunity to 
freely record ideas in a rapid-fire fashion using self-adhesive 
notes.  After discussing the identified problems and 
challenges, day two began with a similar activity to 
brainstorm solutions that could meet the objectives of the 
Lean Event.    
At each of these two stages, the team gathered these notes 
into Affinity Diagrams.  Four main areas of focus ultimately 
emerged: Assurance Design, Risk, Roll-up, and Team 
Organization.  The team then placed the notes assigned to 
each of these categories into a PICK chart, assigning each a 
classification: 
• Possible (easy to implement, low value) 
• Implement (easy to implement, high value) 
• Challenge (hard to implement, high value) 
• Kill (hard to implement, low value). 
Figure 1 shows samples of the PICK charts developed during 
this activity. 
Day three focused on finishing the PICK chart activity, then 
developing the Implementation Plan and identifying and 
assigning Actions.  At the conclusion of the day, the team 
out-briefed the results of the Lean Event and the 
Implementation Plan to the entirety of the Artemis IV&V 
Leadership and analyst community. 
    
 
The Implementation Plan 
The Lean Event Team unanimously agreed that a formalized 
assurance case approach did possess the potential to solve 
Figure 1. Two PICK charts developed during the Lean 
Event 
5 
 
many of the challenges IV&V had been encountering 
previously.  Utilizing assurance cases would allow each team 
to capture more clearly the structured argumentation and its 
underlying evidence and explicit assumptions supporting the 
claims IV&V desired to make. [4]  However, the team did not 
know how to successfully implement such an approach in a 
way that would support the needs of all of the Artemis IV&V 
projects, as well as include the FTR approach to identify the 
correct focus areas across all of the Artemis software 
systems.  The team laid out an Implementation Plan intended 
to continue the progress toward meeting the goals of the Lean 
Event. 
The Lean Event Team tasked Artemis IV&V Leadership with 
establishing an Assurance Architecture Focus Group (AFG), 
a Risk Assessment Team (RAT), and an Assurance Case Pilot 
Team.  These teams were expected to function for 
approximately three months following the Lean Event.  The 
AFG would be tasked with laying the foundation for an 
Artemis Assurance Case, the RAT would identify risk criteria 
and develop an approach to apply them to the assurance case, 
and the Pilot Team would attempt to execute Assurance Case 
design within the assurance architecture and initial processes 
established by the AFG.  Retrospectives led by Artemis 
IV&V Leadership were to be held at appropriate break points. 
These teams would operate concurrently on their respective 
responsibilities, in order to move forward and solve problems 
quickly, but this would require regular interaction between 
teams and leadership to ensure the results were converging. 
The Lean Event Team recognized a need to identify and/or 
develop various tools to support this new approach, assigning 
consideration of these to the AFG.  The backbone would be 
an assurance case generation and management tool or system.  
Tools would also be needed to document workflow, such as 
daily work and progress logging, schedule tracking, and 
evidence and status reporting.  IV&V had a number of tools 
already available that would need to be investigated. 
Artemis IV&V Leadership was tasked with defining the 
reporting requirements for IV&V’s stakeholders.  
Communication issues were identified as a fundamental 
obstacle throughout the Lean Event, so Artemis IV&V 
Leadership was also tasked with developing an Artemis 
IV&V Communication Plan. This plan would have the goal 
of providing a better understanding of expectations from the 
top down and bottom up, and improve communications 
horizontally across projects.  In addition, the Lean Event 
Team made a recommendation to transition toward a single, 
integrated Artemis IV&V Team, as opposed to continuing to 
operate as four independent IV&V projects. 
Finally, the Lean Event Team tasked Artemis IV&V 
Leadership with forward work to develop Artemis-wide 
training.  This would include technical, process, and tool 
training, and would consider the need for establishing 
Working Groups to accomplish this undertaking.  The team 
also suggested follow-on Lean Events focused on Resource 
Management and IV&V Evidence Collection.  The Artemis 
IV&V Leadership saw potential in the results of the Lean 
Event process and Implementation Plan as presented.  
Leadership gave approval to proceed with building an 
Artemis Assurance Case. 
 
4. BUILDING AN ARTEMIS ASSURANCE CASE 
The outcome of the Lean Event indicated a direction the 
Artemis IV&V Team wished to move, but the team still had 
to commit the effort to take the first steps.  From the 
recommendations by the Lean Event participants, team 
members were selected to participate in the AFG, RAT, and 
Pilot Team. 
 
The Assurance Architecture Focus Group 
The AFG began by defining the roles and responsibilities 
surrounding the new Artemis Assurance Case.  The team 
identified the various roles for both analysts and leadership, 
and recognized the need for a new Assurance Architect role 
to persist beyond the achievement of the AFG’s objectives, 
in order to provide oversight and management of the entire 
Artemis Assurance Case. 
The AFG began to build on exploratory activities in 
assurance case design conducted earlier in the year in order 
to construct an architecture for the Artemis Assurance Case.  
They established the first few levels of decomposition of 
assurance claims, in order to uncover the claims that could 
map to the FOCs and other assurance objectives that were in 
focus for Artemis I analysis.  Identifying how Artemis I 
assurance would map into the Artemis Assurance Case would 
be a key step in transitioning the team to the new approach 
later on.  But the AFG also looked beyond the assurance 
approach used on Artemis I to include all desirable arguments 
and assurance strategies, even if not explicitly identified 
before.  The resulting argumentation included mission 
scenario and functional decomposition, cybersecurity, safety, 
and code quality.  The Artemis Assurance Case would need 
to contain the assurance generated for Artemis I, while also 
accommodating additional projects, such as MCC, Gateway, 
and HLS, as well as additional as-yet unknown future 
projects. 
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The AFG gravitated toward Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
[5] as the syntax in which they were writing assurance cases, 
for multiple reasons: 
1. The GSN standard is both comprehensive and easily 
understandable. 
2. The assurance case concepts presented by GSN are 
compatible with IV&V’s approach to evidence-
based assurance. 
3. GSN syntax is broadly applicable to any desired 
IV&V assurance argument, and is extensible for 
managing a large, many-tiered assurance case. 
The AFG took note of many examples of assurance case 
construction in published materials [6][7][8], from which we 
distilled a number of recommended practices in authoring 
assurance cases and using GSN syntax.  In contrast with a 
quality assurance approach that might rely on adherence to 
Figure 2. An Example IV&V Assurance Case Fragment 
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standards or requirements, IV&V’s approach to assurance is 
based primarily on analysis and testing evidence generated 
by IV&V, independently of the development projects.  It 
became apparent that IV&V assurance cases would have a 
unique flavor, describing the results of analysis executed by 
IV&V in response to perceived risk, as opposed to collecting 
and representing evidence provided by the development 
project.  Figure 2 illustrates an example of what a capability-
based, analysis-supported IV&V assurance case fragment 
might look like in the GSN syntax. 
The AFG also began working to instantiate a meta-model in 
Enterprise Architect (EA), a model-based engineering tool 
developed by Sparx Systems, to define the GSN syntax and 
data fields necessary to manage the Artemis Assurance Case.  
The robust modeling environment of EA was at first 
intimidating, but provided much more control and insight 
over the diagram case, as well as a multi-user platform, which 
supports the large team size and geographic distribution. 
As the implementation of assurance cases and GSN became 
clear, the AFG concluded by defining and documenting the 
process which the Artemis IV&V Team would follow to 
decompose the Artemis Assurance Case, as well as execute 
the analysis necessary to support it.  This would be needed to 
train the Pilot Team and, eventually, the rest of the Artemis 
IV&V Team as we transition to the new assurance case 
approach. 
 
The Risk Assessment Team 
While the AFG developed the assurance case approach, the 
RAT worked in parallel on the other, equally important, piece 
to the puzzle – the risk assessment criteria for the entire 
Artemis IV&V Team to use.  IV&V’s FTR process 
necessitates the use of risk assessments to enable the 
comparison of priorities across all of the assurance targets in 
the Artemis Assurance Case.  This was a challenging 
prospect, due to the disparate nature of all of the Artemis 
software systems. 
As principal inputs, the RAT drew from two sources.  The 
Project Based Risk Assessment (PBRA) is a risk assessment 
approach that is a key part of the IV&V project planning and 
scoping process.  The Assurance and Safety Case Analytical 
Network (A-SCAN) tool is a recent addition to the IV&V 
toolset that applies risk assessments, styled after the PBRA, 
to a network of assurance claims to enable quantitative roll-
up of risk and confidence scores, in order to fine-tune IV&V 
analysis effort.  The RAT supplemented these with research 
in risk assessment methodologies from other applications. 
The RAT recognized a need to develop risk criteria that could 
apply at various levels of argument or capability 
decomposition.  What resulted was a multi-tiered, three-
dimensional risk assessment approach, which imposed coarse 
risk criteria at the high level, gradually becoming more 
granular at lower levels of decomposition.  At the top levels 
of the assurance case, we merely need to know if there is 
enough risk present to necessitate decomposing further.  In 
contrast, at the lower levels of the assurance case, we need to 
prioritize the identified risks and decide which claims are 
most important to support with evidence, and how much 
evidence will be sufficient. 
The risk assessment is three-dimensional because it includes 
the typical axes of likelihood and consequence, but also an 
additional consideration of software obligation.  NASA 
IV&V’s role is to assure software, so when assessing 
software risk on mission capabilities we must evaluate not 
just the likelihood and consequence of the failure of those 
capabilities, but also the role which software plays in 
mitigating failures or maintaining reliable operations. 
 
The Pilot Team 
After the AFG and RAT had established some preliminary 
products, the Pilot Team set out to test the execution.  The 
AFG identified a limited scope in the Artemis Assurance 
Case – the pre-launch mission segment – for the Pilot Team 
to decompose down to solutions reflecting evidence obtained 
from IV&V analysis.  This segment was chosen so that we 
could engage IV&V expertise in building assurance cases 
across all four IV&V teams at the time: EGS, SLS, Orion, 
and HEO Integration.  The Pilot Team had to be introduced 
to and trained on assurance case concepts, but found them 
analogous to contemporary IV&V approaches in assurance 
design.  The Pilot Team found that once they had acquired a 
base level of understanding of the capability or scenario for 
which they were building an assurance case, laying out an 
argument defining IV&V’s approach to analyzing it was a 
straightforward task that exercised the skills they already had 
in planning and executing IV&V analysis. 
The Pilot Team also found that in decomposing a scenario 
which involved contributions and interactions between 
multiple systems, the necessary assurance arguments for the 
integration between the systems naturally emerged while 
building the assurance case, or at least became obviously 
missing when reviewed by an analyst familiar with the 
interfaces. 
As the Pilot Team worked, the AFG closely monitored their 
progress, in order to identify lessons learned and promising 
approaches as they defined the process the Artemis IV&V 
Team would adopt for building and maintaining the 
assurance case.  The Pilot Team was able to experiment with 
a number of approaches for modularizing assurance cases, 
ultimately providing the recommendation that the appropriate 
number of Goal decomposition steps between assurance case 
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modules is usually only two or three.  This prevents assurance 
case diagrams from becoming too explosive in size and 
difficult to understand, while still preserving enough context 
on a single diagram for analysts to comprehend it.  The Pilot 
Team also uncovered potential pitfalls, such as decomposing 
from a systems architecture perspective too early, which can 
restrict an integrated assurance perspective, and make the 
assurance case more difficult to maintain when the systems 
change. 
 
5. THE RESULTS 
An intended outcome of this new approach is to achieve a 
structured and integrated message of IV&V’s assurance for 
the Artemis missions overall, as well as to the individual 
development projects.   
We anticipate that this new implementation of an integrated 
Artemis Assurance Case will drive a more cohesive and fluid 
IV&V Team structure, leading toward a more unified 
Artemis IV&V Team while still maintaining concentrations 
of subject matter expertise for the individual systems.  The 
new organization will allow for a more holistic integration 
perspective, an easier flow of expertise between the 
component IV&V projects than previously achieved, and a 
more flexible allocation of resources to support the risk-based 
prioritization of assurance goals.  
To guide the development and use of the Artemis Assurance 
Case, the team laid out an end-to-end process that consists of 
four distinct phases: Assurance Design, Analysis Planning, 
Analysis Execution, and Reporting and Tracking.  Figure 3 
shows a representation of this process, which is based on and 
expands upon the principles of the FTR processes already 
implemented for Artemis IV&V.  A process workflow covers 
each phase, describing when and how the assurance case and 
other tools are used, the necessary review steps and transition 
decision points, as well as the actors and their responsibilities 
at each step.   
The entire process is iterative, as the Artemis Assurance Case 
will be built up over time and some phases have internal 
iteration cycles.  In Assurance Design, assurance cases 
decompose from the mission level down to the level at which 
software capabilities can be identified, based on the system 
understanding generated by analysts.  As these assurance 
cases develop, they are reviewed and assessed for risk, 
allowing analysts to prune low risk branches from the IV&V 
focus areas and prioritize the rest.  Risk assessments can also 
inform the selection and rigor of evidence or arguments used 
in the construction of the assurance case.  After identifying 
individual software entities or behaviors in support of the 
decomposed capabilities, the Analysis Planning phase 
begins, during which analysts develop assurance cases that 
describe the analysis approach and identify the Solutions 
needed to produce the evidence to assure that capability.   
Review of these assurance cases occurs before continuing.  
From the identified Solutions, analysis tasks are realized, and 
during the Analysis Execution phase analysts work these 
tasks.  An analyst may determine that an alternate or 
additional analysis approach is necessary, or learn new 
information that influences the composition of assurance 
cases or risk assessments, thus feeding back to the previous 
two stages.  Eventually, as analyses are completed, we enter 
the Reporting and Tracking phase, in which we report the 
results of analysis to our stakeholders, periodically assess our 
progress based on the identified risks and accumulated 
confidence, plan our priorities for the next work cycle, and 
hold retrospectives to identify what is and is not working and 
solicit feedback from team members.  We anticipate the 
ability to take a snapshot of the Artemis Assurance Case and 
corresponding risk landscape at any given time, allowing us 
to communicate to our stakeholders about any areas of 
concern whenever there is an opportunity to do so. 
A forthcoming challenge is the transition to this Artemis 
Assurance Case approach from the existing processes in use 
for assurance of the Artemis I mission.  IV&V strives to 
maintain synchronicity with the development organizations 
and their product delivery schedules; however, those 
schedules will vary as the projects also transition work 
between missions.  Currently, the Artemis I flight is 
scheduled for late 2020, and the Orion software developer is 
already working primarily on Artemis II products; SLS and 
EGS developers are expected to similarly transition at some, 
likely different, points in 2020.  Thus, the transition at IV&V 
is similarly staggered, with an Orion IV&V Team making the 
first effort to implement the assurance case approach for 
Artemis II.  IV&V Teams for the other systems are 
collaborating with the Orion Team to develop the argument 
structure at the system-to-system integration level.  Later, at 
the points when other development projects and the IV&V 
assurance work on them is likewise transitioning from 
Figure 3: The Artemis Assurance Case Development Process 
1. Assurance Design
•Decompose 
Assurance Cases
•Assess Risk
•Repeat
2. Analysis Planning
•Review Assurance 
Goal(s)
•Identify Necessary 
Evidence
•Plan an Analysis 
Approach
3. Analysis Execution
•Gather Artifacts
•Apply Analysis 
Methods
•Collect Evidence
4. Reporting and 
Tracking
•Communicate 
Results
•Review Progress
•Plan Priorities
•Hold Retrospectives
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Artemis I to Artemis II, IV&V will continue to adopt this 
assurance case process and develop those respective system 
level and software arguments. 
IV&V will also need to translate assurance conclusions and 
supporting evidence that can carry over from Artemis I 
assurance to the Artemis Assurance Case, as some software 
components and behaviors are likely to be reused with little-
to-no modification.  In general, the assurance structures of 
these two approaches are quite different, and it remains an 
open problem to determine how a transfer can be done 
efficiently and accurately while ensuring that nothing is lost 
in the process. 
The MCC and Gateway systems are currently being added to 
the Artemis IV&V portfolio with their planning efforts now 
ramping up, and the HLS is expected to be added at a later 
date.  IV&V expects that assurance case branches for these 
systems will integrate into the Artemis Assurance Case from 
their inception, without a need to transition any prior 
assurance structure. 
IV&V uses a number of commercial and in-house tools for 
various non-technical tasks; for example, Jira for task 
tracking, an in-house database tool for tracking and reporting 
identified defects, and an in-house database tool for tracking 
and reporting identified project risks.  For Artemis I, IV&V 
extended the use of Jira to capture and track the Artemis 
IV&V assurance network, but difficulties maintaining and 
visualizing the network and especially assessing the 
assurance posture at the high levels made this approach 
increasingly untenable.  The different approaches each 
separate Artemis IV&V Team used to plan and assess 
assurance made any higher-level integrated assurance 
conclusions extremely subjective and lacking in a consistent 
viewpoint on risk determination. 
As discussed in Section 3, to facilitate a more consistent 
approach for Artemis IV&V, it was determined that 
continued use of the Artemis I IV&V assurance toolset would 
be inadequate.  Instead, the implementation for the Artemis 
Assurance Case will rely on two main tools: one to capture 
the assurance case, and one to perform the risk assessments 
and capture the assurance status and conclusions.   
For the assurance network itself, a graphical modeling tool is 
desirable to aid in visualization of the network, and EA was 
chosen as the initial candidate.  We found that, with some 
prior experience in using the modeling tool, we were able to 
customize a metamodel that supports all of the syntax and 
data structures we needed.  The Pilot Team also proved that 
IV&V analysts were capable of learning the basic functions 
of EA within a short period, to a level of proficiency required 
to do their work. 
For the risk assessment tool, we are adapting our in-house 
tool A-SCAN to implement the risk assessment approach 
defined by the RAT.  A-SCAN will contain a representation 
of the Artemis Assurance Case, and allow analysts to apply 
risk assessments at the appropriate decomposition steps.  
Later, A-SCAN will collect the results from analysis 
evidence to feed a rollup calculation of confidence in support 
of an assurance objective and provide a consistent 
perspective on the overall assurance posture at any milestone.   
Eventually, we anticipate it will be desirable to have these 
two tools integrated or combined into a single tool solution 
that also interfaces with the other IV&V defect and risk 
tracking tools in order to reduce inefficiencies in the transfer 
of data and reduce maintenance effort.  Artemis IV&V will 
continue to use Jira, but only as a task management and 
tracking tool, rather than as an assurance data repository. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Artemis IV&V Team has made tremendous strides in the 
goal that they set forth for themselves in the Lean event.   
There is still a long way to go to get to where IV&V wants to 
be as a program and the assurance case that IV&V wants to 
have for the Artemis program, but the work described in this 
paper has the team pointed in the right direction.   
One of the biggest takeaways from this experience was the 
value of Lean Six Sigma tools and holding a Lean event like 
the one described that occurred in June of 2019.  The entire 
effort described in this paper is a result of the Lean event and 
the implementation plan that was developed by analysts from 
across the Artemis project portfolio at IV&V.  The idea to 
build an assurance case was a grassroots effort dreamed up 
by the Artemis IV&V analysts after Artemis IV&V 
leadership gave high-level guidance of what problems 
needed to be solved.   
Communication across the Artemis IV&V Program has also 
improved, and both analysts and leadership have identified 
this as one of the best things to come out of this effort.  The 
increase in communication seems to have been due to a 
couple of specific reasons.  The first was the Lean event in 
June that brought together twelve analysts from across the 
Artemis IV&V Program to address specific objectives laid 
out by management.  With two Lean Six Sigma facilitators, 
the team was coached through addressing the challenges in 
front of them and in three days came up with an aggressive 
implementation plan that leadership could get behind.  
Throughout the entire event, the communication between the 
Artemis analysts increased day by day, and one could watch 
the transition from several independent IV&V Teams to a 
group of analysts that represented one common idea shared 
by a single team.  The second reason communication has 
increased was due to the teams that were formed to work the 
implementation plan.  These teams successfully achieved 
their goals laid out in the implementation plan, and 
communication across those teams was one of the main 
driving factors to their success.   
Due in part to this increase in collaboration, the assurance 
case structure itself has turned out to be extremely useful and 
intuitive.  All of those who have worked within the Artemis 
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Assurance Case to date, including the AFG and the Pilot 
Team, have reported an increase in system understanding of 
the entire Artemis mission.  One of the main benefits reported 
is the visibility of system-to-system interactions and other 
various intricacies.  This visibility then allows IV&V to better 
understand and communicate the risk within these cross-
system interactions and plan more complete assurance 
activities in these areas.   
Another benefit from the approach described in this paper is 
the promise of improved external communications.  One of 
the challenges the Lean event participants were looking to 
address was the ability to communicate a cohesive story at 
the mission level.  With all of the Artemis IV&V projects 
now working under an integrated assurance case, rolling up 
assurance at the mission level will occur more naturally.  
These Artemis program-level assurance statements can be 
communicated to various stakeholders both internal and 
external to IV&V including our primary stakeholder, 
NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.  Not many 
entities within NASA are evaluating the combined 
capabilities of these systems prior to integrated testing.  It is 
IV&V’s hope that this work will help us communicate risk in 
integrated areas to decision makers earlier in order to help 
them avoid cost and schedule traps if these risks are realized 
during integration.   
Moving forward, the Artemis IV&V Program wants to utilize 
the Artemis Assurance Case to help manage the work being 
done on all of the Artemis IV&V projects.  As described 
above, the priority of each branch of the assurance case will 
be determined through the assessment process and this 
prioritization will be used to set the objectives of each work 
cycle for the Artemis IV&V Program.  Currently, we are 
already developing and scoring assurance cases for Artemis 
II on Orion, along with MCC and Gateway.  As the Artemis 
I launch approaches, the EGS and SLS teams will begin to 
transition their approach to using the Artemis Assurance 
Case.  This will result in a unified assurance approach for 
Artemis II, the first mission for these projects with astronauts 
on board.   
One of the major hurdles that needs to be cleared in the future 
is tooling.  Currently, the team is using Enterprise Architect 
as described in the paper.  IV&V would like to move toward 
a future tool, developed specifically to implement risk-driven 
assurance case development, built in-house at IV&V and 
adjusted to fit the needs of the Artemis IV&V Program.   
There are still challenges and unknowns in the process 
described in this paper.  Ultimately, IV&V is very much in 
the infancy of using assurance cases and has many more 
lessons to learn in the future.  IV&V views this as a step in 
the right direction for how to add assurance for the mission 
that will enable astronauts to take their next steps on the 
Moon. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, the authors would like to thank the 
members of the Artemis IV&V Program who were 
challenged back in the spring of 2019 to address the problems 
identified by leadership.  Their participation in the Lean Six 
Sigma event as well as continued work throughout the 
summer has led to where the Artemis IV&V Program is 
today.  The authors would like to thank NASA’s IV&V 
Program leadership as well as IV&V contractor leadership 
for supporting the Lean Six Sigma effort and providing a safe 
space for the teams to take risks and innovate, allowing the 
team to come out of this experience with a better 
understanding of the structure that makes the most sense for 
the Artemis IV&V Program.  Leadership has no guarantee 
that this effort will be a success, but the guidance and trust 
that has been given to the team will assure that these analysts 
will try their best, and continue to improve the process until 
it works for the Artemis IV&V Program. 
  
11 
 
REFERENCES 
 [1] NASA’s Artemis Website: https://www.nasa.gov/what-
is-artemis 
[2] Independent Verification and Validation Technical 
Framework (IVV 09-1): 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ivv_09-
1_independent_verification_and_validation_technical_fram
ework_-_ver_p_-_10-25-2017.pdf 
[3] NASA GSFC Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Overview 
PowerPoint presentation, Mark Bollard, Quality Assurance 
Branch, Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate, Goddard 
Space Flight Center. 
[4] IEEE Standard Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-1—Systems 
and Software Engineering—Systems and Software 
Assurance—Part 1: Concepts and Vocabulary 
[5] Goal Structuring Notation Community Standard, 
Version 2, The Assurance Case Working Group: 
https://scsc.uk/r141B:1 
[6] T. P. Kelly, “A Six-Step Method for Developing 
Arguments in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)” (1999). 
[7] S. P. Wilson, J. A. McDermid, C. H. Pygott, & D. J. 
Tombs, “Assessing Complex Computer Based Systems 
using the Goal Structuring Notation” (1996). 
[8] T. P. Kelly & R. A. Weaver, “The Goal Structuring 
Notation – A Safety Argument Notation” (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIOGRAPHIES 
Gerek Whitman received a B.S.  in 
Aerospace Engineering from 
Pennsylvania State University in 2014.  
He has been supporting NASA’s IV&V 
Program as a contractor for 5 years and 
is currently employed by SAIC Inc.  He 
spent his first year with NASA IV&V 
assisting on a Software Assurance 
Research Program (SARP) initiative on Assurance of Fault 
Management Architectures.  He joined the Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) IV&V team as an IV&V 
analyst in 2015, and served as an Orion IV&V Scrum Team 
Lead for six months in 2017.  In 2018, while still on the 
Orion IV&V team, he served as a Capability Based 
Assurance (CBA) champion for the IV&V Office, assisting 
with the advancement of CBA on other IV&V projects. 
Paul Amoroso is a senior software 
systems engineer with 35 years of 
experience working on DoD and NASA 
programs as a software developer, 
software systems architect and 
Software CPE. Twenty-four years of 
this time was spent employed by the 
Lockheed Martin Corporation. He is 
currently employed by TMC Technologies, working in 
NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations IV&V 
projects, as a software integration analyst, reporting 
software assurances to the ESD Integrated Avionics and 
Software Integrated Task Team. Paul received a M. S. in 
Computer Science from the New Jersey Institute of 
Technology in 2005 and a B. S. in Physics from Montclair 
State University in New Jersey in 1982. He continues to 
support the NASA IV&V Program, doing cross-program 
software analysis and supporting the development of an 
Artemis Tri-Program emulation environment for dynamic 
independent testing.  
Greg Black received a B.S. in Physics 
from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) in 1991 followed by 
an M.S. and a Ph.D. in Astronomy 
from Cornell University in 1997.  
Afterwards he worked as a reseacher 
and instructor at the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) and 
then the University of Virginia.   He is currently employed 
by SAIC Inc. and has supported the NASA IV&V Program 
as a contractor since 2010.  He has served as an analyst 
for teams providing software IV&V in support of various 
NASA missions; previously for the Orion Multi-Purpose 
Crew Vehicle (MPCV) including Exploration Flight Test-
12 
 
1 (EFT-1), the Global Precipitation Measurement mission 
(GPM), and the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) 
mission.  He currently continues in that role providing 
software IV&V support for the Space Launch System 
(SLS). 
Deneen Granger received a B.S. in 
Computer Science from Chapman 
University in 1997, and is pursuing a 
Master of Aeronautical Science 
degree from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University.  She has 
been supporting government projects 
as a contractor for 18 years and is 
currently employed by SAIC Inc. She spent 13 years 
supporting the Western Range at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base in California as a software engineering analyst for 
the 30th Space Wing Range Safety IV&V and Performance, 
Evaluation, Test and Simulation (PET&S) contractors.  
There she worked on the Telemetry, Metric Data 
Processing, and Mission Flight Termination Ground 
Systems analysis tasks.  She joined NASA IV&V in 2014 as 
a software engineer on the Exploration Ground Systems 
project, specifically as the lead IV&V analyst on the 
Launch Release Subsystem.  She is currently the functional 
lead for the Electrical Ground and Flight Application 
Software IV&V efforts, as well as the EGS representative 
on the Artemis Assurance Architecture Team. 
Justin Smith received a M.S.  in 
Aerospace Engineering from West 
Virginia University (WVU) in 2007.  
He also has B.S.  degrees in 
Mechanical and Aerospace 
Engineering from WVU.  He has been 
with NASA for 12 years as both a 
contractor and civil servant.  He spent 
his first 4 years with NASA at Johnson Space Center as a 
data processing systems and navigation instructor for the 
Space Shuttle.  Smith transitioned to civil service in 2011 
with the Department of the Navy working submarine 
project management at the Washington Navy Yard.  In 
2013 he returned to NASA as a member of the Strategic 
Communications Office.  He transitioned to the Orion 
IV&V Team in 2015 and has been the project manager 
since the summer of 2016. 
John Bradbury received a B.S. in 
Electrical Engineering from Texas A&M 
University in 1982 and a M.S. in 
Computer Science from the University of 
Houston – Clear Lake in 1987.  He has 
been supporting NASA as a contractor 
for over 37 years and is currently 
employed by SAIC Inc.  He spent his first 15 years 
supporting NASA at Johnson Space Center as a software 
requirements analyst and integrated system software tester 
for the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics Software System.  
Bradbury transitioned to IV&V in 1997 as the contractor 
project lead for Space Shuttle IV&V through the end of the 
Space Shuttle Program in 2011.  He also served as the 
contractor project lead for International Space Station 
(ISS) IV&V in 2005 and 2006.  In 2011 he began 
supporting NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations 
IV&V projects as a technical and management lead.  He 
served as the contractor lead for IV&V’s Technical 
Quality and Excellence Team from April 2014 through 
March 2016.  He transitioned to the Orion IV&V Team as 
its contractor project lead in March 2016. 
Wesley Deadrick received a M.S.  in 
Software Engineering from West 
Virginia University in 2004.  He has 
been with NASA for 17 years as a civil 
servant.  During his time at NASA, he 
has worked as a researcher, an 
engineer, and a manager.  He has 
worked on a number of NASA missions 
including Kepler, Juno, James Webb Space Telescope 
(JWST), Mars Science Lab, Mars Atmosphere and Volatile 
EvolutioN (MAVEN), International Space Station (ISS), 
Origins Spectral Interpretation Resource Identification 
Security Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx), and the 
Constellation Program.  He has also served as the office 
lead for several offices within the NASA IV&V Program 
and currently leads the IV&V Office which is responsible 
for the implementation of the IV&V Program’s support to 
over fifteen science and human-rated NASA missions. 
 
